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A B S T R A C T
Fertilizer use remains below recommended rates in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing to low crop yields
and poverty. We explore the role of fertilizer quality. We interviewed fertilizer sellers in an important agricul-
tural region in Tanzania and sampled their fertilizer to establish that the nutrient content of fertilizers is good,
meeting industry standards. However, we find farmers’ beliefs to be inconsistent with this reality. Beliefs about
adulteration push down farmer willingness-to-pay for fertilizer; with farmers willing to pay more if quality is
verified. In addition, we find some evidence of a quality inference problem: many fertilizers have degraded
appearance, and farmers appear to rely on these observable attributes to (incorrectly) assess unobservable nutri-
ent content. Market prices reflect neither nutrient content nor degradation in appearance, even in competitive
markets. Our results suggest the existence of an equilibrium where farmer beliefs about fertilizer are inconsistent
with the truth, and seller incentives to invest to alter beliefs are limited, motivating future research into the
origins and persistence of such an equilibrium.
1. Introduction
Fertilizer use in Sub-Saharan Africa remains well below profit max-
imizing levels (Sanchez 2002; Sheahan and Barrett 2017). Tanzanian
and Kenyan farmers, for example, apply only 13 kg of fertilizer per
hectare, in contrast with Brazilian and Indian farmers, who apply 175
and 165 kg per hectare, respectively (World Bank, 2020a, 2020b).
While recent literature points to heterogeneity in the yield response
function to fertilizer due to soil and weather conditions, overall the
marginal productivity of fertilizer is high (see, among others Kaliba et
al., 2000, Duflo et al., 2008, Marenya and Barrett 2009, Sileshi et al.,
2010, Chivenge et al., 2011, Beaman et al., 2013, Suri, 2011, Liver-
pool-Tasie, 2017, Harou et al., 2020, Hurley et al., 2018).
What are the reasons for chronically low fertilizer use by small farm-
ers in Sub-Saharan Africa? An extensive literature has emphasized the
role of incomplete and imperfect credit, insurance and output markets
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: hopecm@illinois.edu (H. Michelson).
1 See Li et al. (2013) and Fan et al. (2008) on fertilizer subsidies in China and India; and Scheiterle et al. (2019), Carter et al. (2014), Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2010)
and Chirwa and Dorward (2013) on subsidies in Sub-Saharan Africa.
and the potential importance of fertilizer subsidies (Croppenstedt et
al., 2003, Chirwa 2005, Dercon and Christiaensen 2011, Minten et al.,
2013, Karlan et al., 2014, Liverpool-Tasie, 2017, Harou et al., 2020),1
as well as farmer characteristics including risk-aversion and time prefer-
ences (Duflo et al., 2011). Researchers have also considered the role of
social networks and information. Conley and Udry (2010), for instance,
observe that farmers in Ghana learn about the optimal application of
fertilizer on pineapple production (a new crop in the region) from their
network contacts (see also Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 2004).
In this paper, we explore an additional important contributing cause
for this under-use of fertilizer: a belief among farmers that the product
available to them at local markets is of poor quality. The actual quality
of fertilizer – its nutrient content – is not evident from visual observa-
tion; and in contexts of weak regulation and limited product standards
enforcement, opportunities might indeed exist for Akerlof’s (1970)
“dishonest sellers” to offer “bad wares as good wares and thereby tend
to drive the good wares out of the market” (p. 495); and awareness of
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this possibility can decrease the demand among farmers.2
We selected Tanzania as the focus for our study. The share of
small farmers using fertilizer is low in Tanzania: the 2014-15 Tanza-
nian National Panel Survey found that only 16% report using fertilizers
(Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics 2017).3 In addition, anecdotal
evidence indicates that farmers in Tanzania believe that the fertilizer
available in local shops is substandard. Farmers report suspicions about
fertilizer sold past its expiration date, along with concerns about pur-
chasing urea fertilizer that has been mixed with table salt, or diammo-
nium phosphate (DAP) diluted with powdered concrete, compromising
its agronomic effects.
In this paper, we use quantitative and qualitative data on a sample of
farmers in the Morogoro Region in Tanzania, and a census of fertilizer
sellers within the same region to establish fertilizer quality, and to mea-
sure the concerns of farmers and sellers. First, we collect rich measures
of fertilizer quality for an entire region and we document descriptive
patterns of quality variation. Second, we elicit buyers’ willingness-to-
pay for fertilizer and conduct an information treatment to assess how
farmers respond to information about the quality. Third, we examine
seller behavior, both in terms of pricing and quality investment.
First, to establish fertilizer quality in the market, we visited all sell-
ers in the Morogoro Region of Tanzania. We interviewed these sellers,
and collected information on their business and the local market. We
then used mystery-shoppers to purchase 633 fertilizer samples from the
225 fertilizer sellers and to record prices and other features of the trans-
action. We focus our analysis on three of Tanzania’s most prevalent
and agriculturally important fertilizer types: urea, calcium ammonium
nitrate (CAN) and diammonium phosphate (DAP). We tested the fertil-
izer in laboratories in both Kenya and the United States (a randomly
selected subset were double tested in both laboratories) and confirmed
that the quality of fertilizers in this market is good, meaning that the
nitrogen content was in compliance with the manufacturer standard4:
only six of 300 urea samples were out of compliance with industry stan-
dards and with a mean percent nitrogen deviation of 0.28%. We find
that the mean percent deviations for the other fertilizers, CAN and DAP
are also modest: 5.9% and 3.0% respectively. Additional testing at the
Dar es Salaam port (where nearly all fertilizer in Tanzania enters the
country) and warehouses, and interviews with sellers, confirm the qual-
ity of the fertilizer on the market in Tanzania. The finding of adequate
nutrient content in marketed fertilizer, especially for urea, is consistent
with recent large-scale assessments conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Sanabria et al., 2013, 2018a, 2018b, Mbowa et al., 2015; Ashour et
al., 2017a).
Second, to obtain and understand the farmers’ perspective, we inter-
viewed 165 farmers, collecting information on fertilizer use and their
perceptions regarding fertilizer quality. To assess demand for fertilizers,
we set up a “store” at a central village location, with three samples of
urea fertilizer which we purchased in the local market (we will return
to these three samples later, for now it suffices to say that they dif-
fered in terms of observable attributes) and had tested to ensure that
they all met the required industry standards for nutrient content of
46% nitrogen. For each urea sample, we asked the farmer to state her
2 Poor quality fertilizer would have direct effects on yields. Mather et al.
(2016) calculate a linear maize-nitrogen response rate for Tanzania of 7.6 kg of
maize per kilogram of nitrogen applied; 10% nitrogen missing from the fertilizer
would mean a 10% loss in production.
3 Similarly, Tanzania’s 2014 Agricultural Statistics Strategic Plan mentions
that the latest, 2007/08, National Sample Census of Agriculture noted that 13%
of smallholder farmers use chemical fertilizer (Tanzania National Bureau of
Statistics, 2012, 2014).
4 Fertilizer quality is represented by the degree to which its measured nutrient
content is consistent with the manufacturer standard for each fertilizer. The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sets standards for each
fertilizer sold in the region. Urea fertilizer for example is 46% nitrogen and is
considered out of compliance if it is found to have less than 45%.
willingness-to-pay, first without providing any additional information
about the nutrient content, and then when informed that the fertilizer
had been tested by a reputable laboratory and found to meet industry
standards for nitrogen.5
Consistent with anecdotes regarding farmers’ expectations of low
quality, we find that farmers are willing to pay considerably less for
untested fertilizers in the market than they are for the tested fertiliz-
ers: the willingness-to-pay for 1 kg of urea fertilizer in the absence of
information about its nutrient content proved to be 48% lower than
the post-information willingness-to-pay (1489 TZS versus 2201 TZS; or
0.65 USD versus 0.96 USD).6 These pessimistic beliefs among farmers
about agricultural input quality are consistent with the survey results
and further qualitative interviews: 43% of farmers in our sample suspect
adulterated fertilizer is sold in local markets. They are also in line with
Ashour et al. (2017b) for herbicides in Uganda, Gharib et al. (2020) for
seeds in Kenya and Norton et al. (2020) for fertilizer in Tanzania. These
results suggest that incorrect beliefs about fertilizer quality likely affect
demand, consistent with other studies linking beliefs to behavior in the
agricultural sector (Delavande et al., 2011; Cole et al., 2017; Maertens
2017).7
Our results from the willingness-to-pay exercise also suggest that
farmers are attentive to the physical appearance of the fertilizer. In a
context of incomplete and asymmetric information, a fertilizer’s observ-
able appearance may be among the signals that farmers try and use
to infer unobservable quality. The willingness-to-pay exercise included
three samples: one sample was in pristine physical condition; the sec-
ond sample contained large caked aggregates of urea; and the third
included a small amount of visually obvious foreign material and impu-
rities. This sort of observable degradation of fertilizer is common in
the market (38% of the fertilizer samples our mystery shoppers pur-
chased exhibited some degradation in physical appearance) and tends
to result from poor storage and transport conditions, common prob-
lems in the region. Farmers’ pre-information willingness-to-pay for the
pristine sample is approximately twice the willingness-to-pay for the
samples with poor physical appearance. When presented with informa-
tion on the true nutrient content, farmers revise their willingness-to-pay
upwards for all samples, but significantly more for samples with poor
observable attributes. Qualitative interviews confirm that many farmers
use the physical appearance of fertilizer as an indicator of the underly-
ing quality.
Our results suggest that farmer beliefs about fertilizer quality are
inconsistent with the truth. These incorrect farmer beliefs may persist
due to the difficulties farmers face in assessing quality in a stochastic
production environment (Beaman et al., 2013; Bold et al., 2017; Norton
et al., 2020). Smallholders grow crops under conditions of adverse and
variable weather and pest pressure. In addition, farmers may under-
invest in complementary inputs such as labor as they lower their esti-
mate of the marginal productivity given beliefs that the available fer-
tilizer is poor (Beaman et al., 2013). Farmers may also be applying
fertilizers incorrectly, possibly based on inaccurate government recom-
mendations.8
The third component of our analysis focuses on fertilizer prices.
5 We discuss the willingness-to-pay exercise in detail in section 3.3 but it
bears mentioning that farmers in the sample were experienced using and pur-
chasing fertilizer and understood well the concept of nitrogen content.
6 The prevailing market price for one kilo of urea at the time was 1500 TZS.
7 Farmers’ strong response to credible information is consistent with recent
literature establishing farmer and market response to information inputs
(Campenhout, 2017; Aker et al., 2016; Rosenzweig and Udry 2014), but in con-
trast with mixed evidence from a soil information program in India (Fishman
et al., 2016) and SMS-based extension in East Africa (Fabregas et al., 2019).
8 Harou et al. (2020) find evidence of agronomically important local within-
village variability in soil nutrient needs distinct from government fertilizer rec-
ommendations among a sample of 1000 farmers in 50 villages in the same
region in Tanzania where our research is conducted.
2
H. Michelson et al. Journal of Development Economics 148 (2021) 102579
Overall, prices exhibit little variation within or across markets on a
given day. Fertilizer price does not reflect nutrient content (of which
there is little variation). It also does not seem to vary with respect to
physical appearance. While our qualitative surveys reveal that some
farmers receive a discount for fertilizer with highly compromised phys-
ical condition, and some sellers admit to giving them, these discounts
are not common, or substantial enough, to change the null relationship
we find in our data.
Nonetheless, given the presence of information asymmetries and
farmer beliefs, why isn’t adulteration at the agro-dealer level more
widespread? One key insight, well established in industry yet absent
from the academic literature, is that successful, profitable adulteration
of fertilizer is actually difficult (Joaquin Sanabria, personal communi-
cation, March 27, 2018, Yara International, 2012, Rutland and Polo
2015). Substantial quantities of low-value fillers must be included for
adulteration to pay-off given low margins and low sales volumes of
most retailers; and only farmers with minimal knowledge of fertilizers
are likely to be deceived.9 Given that small farmers currently represent
only a small share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s fertilizer market in terms of
purchase quantities, such deception is unlikely to pay off at the retail
level. Moreover, large-scale fraud at the point at which the fertilizer is
bagged (it arrives at the port in bulk) runs higher risks of detection.
In the next section, we provide additional background and context
for the study. The third section provides an overview of the data col-
lected from agro-dealers, farmers, as well as fertilizer sampling and
testing. We present the empirical analysis and results in Section 4. We
conclude with reflections for policy and further research, including the
possibility of a certification scheme for fertilizer in Tanzania.
Before we proceed, a note on terminology. When we refer to fertil-
izer in this paper, we mean mineral, inorganic fertilizer; as opposed to
organic fertilizer, such as mulch or compost.
2. Background
Agriculture is a critical sector for employment and food security
in Tanzania but its growth has lagged the rest of the economy in
recent years. Low-input and rain-fed subsistence farming dominates
the sector and the use of fertilizer is extremely low. A recent report
by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) found
that the most commonly used fertilizers in the country include urea,
diammonium phosphate (DAP), calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN), and
nitrogen-phosphorous-potassium fertilizer (NPK). In 2010, urea and
DAP accounted for half of the fertilizer used in Tanzania with NPK
consisting of about 20% and CAN 9% (Benson et al., 2012). While the
official government recommendation for one acre of maize cultivation
is 60 kg of urea and 40 kg of DAP, farmers on average apply fewer
than 9 kg of fertilizer per acre (IFDC 2012). The report also found that
urea was the fertilizer most commonly stocked and sold by agro-dealers,
accounting for more sales income than all other fertilizers put together.
Nearly all fertilizer in Tanzania is imported to the port in Dar es
Salaam. Upon arrival at the port, the fertilizer is removed from the ship-
ping containers (where it is transported loose and in bulk) and bagged
in 25 and 50 kg manufacturer bags. Tanzania’s fertilizer trade associ-
ation included ten firms in 2011 but only three of these consistently
imported fertilizer into the country; the remaining seven companies
obtained their product from these importers (Benson et al., 2012).
From Dar es Salaam, fertilizer begins its trip inland, passing through
the hands of multiple wholesalers and sellers before reaching rural
farmers. The ten companies who bag imported fertilizer either sell to
9 This contrasts with the findings of Kroll and Rustagi (2017) who tested the
quality of buffalo milk in New Delhi (for the presence of water) and investigated
motives for dishonesty. They find, on average, a 17% water content in the tested
milk and note that dishonest milkmen consequently earn, on average, 210 USD
more per year, compared to honest ones.
intermediate wholesalers or transport the fertilizer inland themselves
to storage depots used to supply the large number of small retail sell-
ers. In this context, these retail sellers are referred to as agro-dealers,
as they buy and sell agricultural inputs. We will henceforward also use
this terminology so as to distinguish agro-dealers from the wholesale
sellers and importers. These agro-dealers operate independently of the
large fertilizer companies; that is, they are not subsidiaries of specific
companies though they sometimes receive stock on credit or negotiate
an exclusive relationship with a brand.
Fertilizer quality is only minimally monitored in Tanzania. The
Fertilizer Act of 2009 established the Tanzania Fertilizer Regulatory
Authority (TRFA) to enforce policies related to fertilizer manufactur-
ing, importation, and use but a 2017 report by the African Fertilizer
and Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP 2017) noted:
“TFRA remains under-funded with few professional staff … it
depends on 100 “inspectors” (who) do not provide reliable inspec-
tion (and testing) services to TFRA as they have multiple respon-
sibilities and lack the resources (transport, testing equipment) and
technical skill (proper taking of samples) to do their job properly
… What should be an important regulatory body is, therefore, quite
weak due to a lack of institutional and human resource capacity.”
(p. 11)
We conduct this work in Tanzania’s agricultural Morogoro Region.
Morogoro Region’s fertilizer sales market is geographically disperse,
reaching far out into rural areas along major roads, with small clus-
ters of agro-dealers located in a large number of market centers. The
agro-dealer census we conducted in Morogoro Region identified 102
market centers with shops selling fertilizer. Of these, 54 had only one
agro-dealer, 23 had two agro-dealers, 11 had three, and 14 had four or
more. Nearly all agro-dealers are open year round rather than running
seasonal operations. In urban areas, agro-dealers tend to cluster along
major roads or thoroughfares. In rural areas, agro-dealers tend to locate
along the road in clusters with other village shops. It is uncommon for
agro-dealers to be located in isolated areas far from major roads or
other shops and businesses.
3. Data collected
Between November 2015 and May 2016, we collected data from
225 fertilizer agro-dealers in the Morogoro region of Tanzania and a
sample of 165 farmers in the same region. We collected qualitative
and quantitative data from these agro-dealers and farmers using sur-
veys, including information on prices, beliefs, and willingness-to-pay;
laboratory tests of sampled fertilizer provided information on fertilizer
quality. In 2018, we collected additional qualitative data among agro-
dealers and farmers in the area; and in 2016–2018 we visited locations
upstream in the supply chain, including warehouses and ships at the
port of Dar es Salaam for further observation and laboratory testing.
We first introduce the agro-dealer and farmer samples and then dis-
cuss the willingness-to-pay elicitation, the qualitative surveys, and the
fertilizer testing.
3.1. Agro-dealer sample
We conducted a census to identify all agro-dealers with operations
in the Morogoro Region and then proceeded to survey these 225 agro-
dealers.10 We interviewed the agro-dealers and collected information
10 To our knowledge no census had before been conducted of the number
of fertilizer sellers operating in Morogoro or Tanzania. The 2009 Fertilizers
Act requires that all fertilizer sellers and sales locations must be registered
with the government but few of the sellers we found in our regional cen-
sus had the required registrations. This is an important methodological point:
any researcher exclusively using the government’s licensing lists as a sampling
frame would have missed the majority of the sellers operating in the region.
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about the scale, seasonality, and history of the operation, participation
in government programs, wholesalers where the shop sourced fertilizer,
and types of fertilizer stocked and in which months.
Table 1 (Panel A) presents descriptive statistics for the agro-dealers.
Nearly all agro-dealers report selling urea fertilizer: 98% answered affir-
matively to the question “Have you ever sold urea fertilizer?” and 81%
report that they stock some kind of fertilizer throughout the year.
Agro-dealers operated businesses in clusters of other agro-dealers,
with an average of 2.22 agro-dealers per market location. The mean
within-market center Herfindahl index11 is 0.75, indicating a lack of
competition between agro-dealers; for the subsample of market centers
with more than one agro-dealer, the mean Herfindahl index is slightly
lower, 0.63. The upstream market is also concentrated, 65% of the agro-
dealers source from just one supplier, with an average of 1.66 suppliers
per agro-dealer. For all 225 agro-dealers, we only have 36 suppliers.
In addition to the survey visit, enumerators operating as mystery
shoppers visited each surveyed shop twice to purchase fertilizer – once
in November or December 2015 before the start of the primary grow-
ing season and once during planting and cultivation in March and April
2016. The enumerator followed a pre-defined script: he greeted the
shopkeeper and asked the shopkeeper to buy 1 kg of urea, DAP, and
CAN. If the shop had all three types available, the enumerator pur-
chased all three. If the shop had only two types or one type available,
the enumerator purchased the type(s) that were available. Enumerators
dressed in the way that a farmer would dress if he was making a visit to
town; enumerators were all male and wore collared shirts, trousers, and
sandals. In the case that enumerators were asked additional questions
by the agro-dealer, they were prepared to respond with locally appro-
priate responses. For example, on occasion, our enumerators were asked
by agro-dealers on which crop they intended to apply the fertilizer(s).
Enumerators were aware of the major crops grown in the location, and,
as such, were able to engage the agro-dealers.
While the mystery shoppers were unknown to the agro-dealers, this
situation is not uncommon given that shops selling fertilizer are located
in market centers with other retail shops and receive customers from
surrounding areas. 60% of the surveyed farmers reported purchasing
mineral fertilizer from a shop located outside of their village area and
only 16% reported that they had a relationship with an input shop that
would allow them to delay payment (purchase on credit) for fertil-
izer if they needed to do so. Moreover, analysis of farmer level price
data indicates that prices reported by farmers are not statically differ-
ent from those collected by mystery shoppers (see Appendix Table A8
and Appendix Figure A1). Finally, prevalence of observable degrada-
tion and nitrogen content are also statistically indistinguishable across
the farmer and mystery shopper samples (see Table 2).
Enumerator mystery shoppers purchased 300 urea samples, 137
DAP, and 196 CAN, a total of 633 samples of fertilizer. After purchasing
the samples, the enumerator also recorded features of the transaction
including the price, the brand, and whether the fertilizer was scooped
from an open bag. It should be noted that not all agro-dealers had all
types of fertilizer in stock during these visits; hence the total number of
samples is less than what one would expect.12
11 A measure of market competition calculated by squaring the market share
of each firm competing in a market and then summing the squares.
12 Two factors are relevant here: first, there is considerable churning in inputs
supply shops, with shops going in and out of business and closing temporar-
ily or not being able to get stock when they need it. For instance, among the
225 agro-dealers, 45 did not have urea in stock when we visited them before
planting (2015 round) and were not open on the day that the mystery shoppers
returned again during the planting season (2016 round) – either because they
were idiosyncratically closed or because they had closed permanently. Of the
other 180 agro-dealers, 60 either had urea in stock before planting or after but
not both.
3.2. Farmer sample
We worked with the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture’s
(IITA) Africa RISING initiative to select a sample of 12 villages in
Mvomero District, Morogoro Region. We selected these 12 villages pur-
posively as villages where at least some farmers were regularly using
fertilizers given the goal of our project was to understand the region’s
entire fertilizer supply chain. As part of the project, we needed to under-
stand farmer fertilizer use and purchasing behavior. As we were aware
of the low share of farming households using fertilizers in rural Tan-
zania, and our budget was relatively limited to cover only 12 villages,
we opted to purposefully select villages which would have a signifi-
cant share of farmers with some experience with fertilizers. All farmers
with prior fertilizer experience were invited to participate in our sur-
vey. In total, we surveyed 165 farmers and collected qualitative and
quantitative data on farmer demographics, crops grown, previous expe-
rience purchasing and using fertilizer, and general perceptions of fertil-
izer quality in markets.
Table 1 (Panel B) introduces the farmers’ sample. Farmers in the
sample are more likely to be male, are 46 years of age on average
and have mean landholdings of 5.84 acres. On average, farmers in the
sample had at least completed primary school; only one percent of the
farmers reported no schooling. Farmers grow a range of crops and while
nearly all had purchased fertilizer previously, 78% had purchased urea
in the 12 months previous to the survey. 24% of the farmers inter-
viewed listed purchasing high quality fertilizer among their top two
concerns as they prepared for the start of a typical agricultural season
(other options included the start and duration of the rains, purchasing
high quality seeds, and access to financing for inputs). We view 24%
as a relatively high percentage of farmers reporting concerns about
quality, given that farmers in this region of Tanzania face a multi-
tude of constraints, ranging from credit and insurance limitations, to
a lack of bargaining power and access to reliable output markets, and
an increasingly variable climate (for some recent studies set in Sub-
Saharan Africa, see, Giné and Yang, 2009, Sexton 2013, Manda et al.,
2015, Baffes et al., 2019 and Janzen and Carter 2019). Moreover, 43%
of the farmers reported concerns about adulterated fertilizer in markets,
with 15% of farmers believing that 50% or more of the fertilizer for sale
in local markets was likely adulterated and 28% believing that between
zero and 50% was adulterated.13
Farmers also provided the research team with a small (0.25 kg)
sample of fertilizer from their home and answered questions about the
source and use of that fertilizer.14 Finally, we completed a willingness-
to-pay exercise with the farmers. We discuss the implementation of this
exercise next.
13 Farmers were asked were asked to assess “How big of a concern is mineral
fertilizer adulteration for you” and were asked to choose among the following
responses: not a problem; a very big problem affecting a majority of the fertil-
izer in the market; somewhat of a problem, affecting about half of the fertilizer
in the market; a little bit of a problem, affecting fewer than half of the fertilizer
in the market.
14 On the day of the survey, the research team arrived earlier than the agreed-
upon time. This ensured that the team would be able to observe the behavior
of the extension officer, lead farmer, or other participants and to verify that
none of the fertilizer samples had been divided or shared among participants.
In each village, the survey was conducted at the local village government office.
As participants arrived, the research field supervisor began a screening process
of each of the participants and their fertilizer. The field supervisor asked each
of the participants a set of questions about their fertilizer sample/s, including:
(1) What type of fertilizer did you bring? (2) To which crop/s did you apply
this fertilizer? (3) Did you apply this fertilizer during the planting stage or
the cultivation stage? (4) Where did you buy this fertilizer? (5) What was the
original amount of fertilizer purchased? (6) How much did you pay for it?
Participants who were able to answer these questions easily and confidently
were invited to participate in the survey. Five participants were excluded from
the survey as a result of the screening process.
4
H. Michelson et al. Journal of Development Economics 148 (2021) 102579
Table 1
Agro-dealer and farmer descriptive statistics.
Mean (SD) Min Max
Panel A: Fertilizer sellers (n = 225)
Sell fertilizer all months of the year (share) 0.81
Sell urea fertilizer (share) 0.98
Have an exclusive relationship with a fertilizer manufacturer (share) 0.21
Source fertilizer directly from Dar es Salaam (share) 0.28
Licensed by the government to sell fertilizer (share) 0.41
Report selling the largest amount of fertilizer to small farmers (share) 0.92
Distance from Dar es Salaam (km) 273.26 (85.62) 127.49 443.24
Number of fertilizer sellers per market location 2.22 (2.52) 1 21
Number of suppliers where agro-dealer sources fertilizer 1.66 (0.93) 1 4
Years in business 4.18 (4.34) 0.1 30
Panel B: Farmers (n = 165)
Male (share) 0.62
Ever purchased mineral fertilizer (share) 0.99
Purchased urea fertilizer in the past 12 months (share) 0.78
Grew maize in 2016 season (share) 0.81
Grew rice in 2016 season (share) 0.85
Grew vegetables in 2016 season (share) 0.44
Purchasing high quality fertilizer
among top two concerns at season start (share) 0.24
Believe ≥ 50% of the fertilizer in the market adulterated (share) 0.15
Believe > 0 but < 50% of fertilizer in the market adulterated (share) 0.28
Age (years) 45.93 (11.34) 22 79
Land owned (acres) 5.84 (10.50) 0 100
Source: authors’ own calculations from agro-dealer and farmer surveys.Sell urea fertilizer is the agro-dealer’s
response to the question - “Please tell me the types of fertilizer that you sell at this location”.
3.3. Eliciting willingness-to-pay
We elicited farmers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) using a series of hypo-
thetical questions based on the contingent valuation method commonly
used to value environmental public goods (for an introduction see
Mitchell and Carson 1989; and Bateman and Willis 2001). The method
is hypothetical – i.e., the farmers did not actually purchase any fertilizer
from the enumerators. It is, however, a common method to establish
demand for yet unavailable goods and services in developing coun-
try contexts (see, among others, Matuschke et al., 2007, Hill et al.,
2013, and Penn and Hu 2018). In our case, we use the method to cre-
ate a counterfactual scenario for the fertilizer market: What would the
demand be if the farmers had no concerns about fertilizer quality? Using
a WTP exercise to gain insight into this counterfactual scenario is not
uncommon in this literature. Sanogo and Masters (2002), for instance,
present mothers in Mali with a choice experiment focused on infant
food.15 We used an open-ended elicitation of the farmer’s valuation of
the fertilizer, which has been shown to better elicit values than methods
based on dichotomous choice (Lybbert 2006; Balistreri et al., 2001; List
and Gallet 2001). We showed farmers three samples of urea fertilizer
that we had previously purchased from agro-dealers in the Morogoro
region and whose nitrogen content we had tested in a lab. We carefully
explained to the farmer that each of the three samples was purchased
in markets in the Morogoro region. We did this in order to emphasize
to the farmers that they were not encountering an entirely new product
15 Other methods are also possible. Bai (2015) uses an experimental approach,
and provides quality certification labels and branding in the watermelon market
in China. Anagol (2017) contrasts two markets for cows in India: an open mar-
ket, which is subject to adverse selection, and within-social network market,
where asymmetric information is less present.
(a new fertilizer from the United States for example).16
All samples met international fertilizer standards and had the same
nutrient content: 46% nitrogen. All three samples can therefore be con-
sidered good quality in terms of their unobservable (to the farmer)
nutrient content. However, the three samples differed in terms of their
physical attributes. Fig. 1 presents pictures of the three samples: Sam-
ple A was of good appearance (bright white and clean with no caked
aggregates or foreign material present); Sample B included large hard
caked clumps; and Sample C included the presence of a small amount of
dark colored foreign material, likely prills of another kind of fertilizer.
The assessment was conducted in a central location in each village
but each farmer completed the exercise individually with an enumera-
tor, separated from the rest of the respondents. We proceeded in three
steps17:
1. First, farmers were provided with the samples to inspect as they
wished. Farmers were asked to assess the quality and to report their
WTP for 1 kg of urea of equivalent quality for each of the three
samples. Enumerators were asked to explain to the farmer that he
should respond with a price (in Tanzanian Shillings) reflecting not
what he thought the urea would cost, but instead a price reflecting
what the urea was worth to the farmer.
2. Second, the enumerator presented farmers with test results on the
nitrogen content of each of the three urea samples. Farmers were
informed that nutrient content tests were conducted in a lab in the
United States, and that the sample met industry standards for nitro-
gen.
3. Finally, the farmer was asked to report his (post-information) WTP.
16 Note that is possible that farmers perceived this post-information treatment
product as an altogether new product, and hence any discrepancy in pre and
post information does not necessarily capture the pessimistic beliefs about qual-
ity. We however believe this not to be the case as we made explicit to the farm-
ers that we had purchased the samples in local markets, and, as we describe in
the results section, the discrepancy in pre-information WTP between the differ-
ent samples is too substantial to not reflect pessimistic beliefs.
17 Further details about the elicitation are available in the appendix.
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Fig. 1. Pictures of samples shown to farmers for the
willingness-to-pay assessment. All three 1 kg samples
of urea were purchased as shown by the research
team in markets in Morogoro Region and this was
communicated clearly to the farmer. All three sam-
ples were tested by Thornton Labs in the United
States and were found to contain 46% nitrogen. Sam-
ple A was clean with no caking; Sample B included
two large, hard caked aggregates; and Sample C
included the presence of a small amount of darkly
colored foreign material mixed in the urea.
As urea fertilizer is available in local markets, the local market price
(plus farmer transaction costs) should serve as an upper bound on the
pre-information WTP (that is, before the farmers are informed about the
quality of the product). We find that this is the case: less than 3% (15
out of 494 responses to the pre-information WTP) of farmers’ reported
WTP estimates exceed the highest per kg market price for fertilizer we
observed in markets. However, the second half of our assessment exer-
cise introduces a good that is not currently available in markets: there
is no market currently for fertilizer with nutrient quality tested by an
independent third party (here, a research team using a United States
lab).
Throughout the WTP exercise, farmers demonstrated awareness and
understanding of the concept of fertilizer nutrients, and nutrient con-
tent. This is consistent with the results of our focus group interviews
(summarized in the next sub-section) indicating that farmers under-
stand that urea provides nitrogen and that the fertilizer is supposed
to have the content of nitrogen advertised on the bag.
All farmers were asked to report WTP for Sample A, followed by the
WTP for Sample B and then WTP for Sample C. All samples were shown
to each farmer simultaneously to reduce the possibility of anchoring
or ordering effects. In the analysis, we will focus on differences in
WTP between samples as well as pre/post information, which avoids
some of the primary concerns associated with order effects, should they
be present.18 Enumerators elicited these three WTP one-after-the-other
and the whole exercise took less than 10 min.
Social desirability bias, i.e. the tendency to present oneself in the
best possible light while being observed, could have affected the results
(Nederhof 1985), and in particular the estimates of the information
effects. Our elicitation strategy employed best practices, including a
neutral phrasing of the questions, and careful training of enumerators
to not prompt respondents. Moreover, no one apart from the respon-
dent and enumerator was present to observe the bidding and survey. It
should also be noted that fertilizers on their own lack any normative
attributes; the presence of normative attributes may exacerbate social
desirability bias (Lusk and Norwood 2006).
As mentioned above, the WTP questions were hypothetical; farmers
did not actually purchase the urea fertilizer bags we presented to them.
This decision to elicit hypothetical WTP was made for logistical reasons
– in order to make between-farmer comparisons it was essential that
the exact same products were presented to each farmer, i.e., fertilizer
of the same color, with the same number of caked aggregates and the
same amount of foreign material. Selling the fertilizer to one particular
18 We recognize that order effects might still be a concern, and farmers might
benchmark their valuation of samples B and C to what they stated for sample
A. We have however no prior as to the degree to which order effects would be
present in this setting as the literature has reported cases with significant order
effects (as in Holt and Laury 2002, and 2005) and cases without any evidence
of order effects (as in Alpizar et al., 2011; Harrison et al., 2005).
farmer would have prevented us from using the same product in the
next village. Our exercise was explicitly framed as a fertilizer-buying
scenario with experienced fertilizer purchasers, and respondents, all of
whom were literate and had experience purchasing fertilizer in the mar-
ket, expressed and displayed little trouble imagining how they would
react. Hence, following conclusions in Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
noting that in this case, “subjects have no special reason to disguise
their true preferences” (p. 265, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) we are
confident that results provide some first insights into farmer assessment
of fertilizer quality and response to information about unobservable
nutrient content.19
3.4. Qualitative surveys
In addition to the farmer surveys, we completed a series of qualita-
tive interviews with farmers and agro-dealers in 2018. These additional
interviews were motivated by the first set of research results reported
in this paper, and hence had a focus on the physical attributes of the
fertilizer.
The qualitative surveys included 15 in-person interviews with ran-
domly selected agro-dealers in Morogoro town, and their 41 customers
in May 2018; two focus group interviews with a total of 40 farm-
ers in two villages near Morogoro town in November 2018, and 43
phone interviews with farmers in Morogoro town and nearby villages
in September 2018.
We asked agro-dealers about the prevalence of physical degrada-
tion, the relationship between physical appearance of the fertilizer and
the price, and the prevention of physical degradation. With the store
customers, we also inquired about the prevalence of physical degra-
dation, their interpretation of such degradation, and the prevalence of
bargaining, discounts, and refunds when fertilizer has poor physical
appearance. The later phone interviews not only expanded the sample
of farmers, but asked farmers directly about their perceptions of and
experiences with adulterated fertilizer. Finally, the focus group inter-
views at the end of 2018 focused on how farmers think about nitrogen
content, beliefs formation, and the role of the media in their under-
standing of fertilizer quality in the region.
3.5. Testing the fertilizer samples
We collected a total of 633 fertilizer samples from agro-dealers and
187 samples from farmers. Purchased samples were stored in their orig-
19 The effect of using hypothetical payments as opposed to real payments has
not yet been settled in the literature. The validity depends on the nature of the
context and elicitation method. In the literature focused on risk-preferences,
some studies have found evidence of differences between the two methods (as
in Holt and Laury 2002) while others have found no such discrepancies (Bin-
swanger 1980).
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inal plastic bag packaging and labeled with the store and purchase
information for the purposes of creating unique sample identifications.
Samples were packed and sealed in doubled Ziploc bags immediately
after purchase and placed in airtight plastic bins for storage until test-
ing. The Soil-Plant Diagnostics Spectral Lab at the World Agroforestry
Centre (ICRAF) in Nairobi, Kenya, conducted the nutrient content test-
ing for all of the fertilizer samples. Details on the testing are provided
in the appendix.20 A randomly selected subsample of the fertilizer was
sent to Thornton Labs in the United States.21 The correlation coefficient
between the nitrogen content of the 59 samples tested at both ICRAF
and Thorton is 0.97 and all samples had a difference between the mea-
sures of less than 1%.
Samples were tested for the degree to which they deviated from
what is known as their fertilizer grade – the guaranteed content of
nutrients.22 The nutrient content is expressed as a percentage of the
fertilizer weight. For example, urea is 46% nitrogen and is referred to
as a straight fertilizer because it only contains one nutrient, whereas
DAP contains two nutrients and is 18% nitrogen and 46% phosphate.
In addition, we took photographs of all samples acquired from agro-
dealers and farmers on the day of purchase, and used these to visu-
ally code physical condition: caking, discoloration, presence of foreign
material (ex: dirt, grass, maize grains, stones), and powdered granules.
These are readily observable, physical attributes. Because photographs
were taken the day of purchase, these observable attributes were not
impacted by transport or storage. Two independent coders (one in Tan-
zania and one in the United States) completed visual coding with a
correlation across the attributes of 0.96.
While nutrient quality – specifically fertilizer missing nutrients –
can result from either manufacturing impurities or adulteration by
wholesalers or agro-dealers, degradation of physical appearance gen-
erally results from poor supply chain management and logistics prob-
lems: poor handling at port, poor transport conditions, storage prob-
lems, exposure to high temperatures and humidity and product aging
(Sanabria et al., 2013).23 These observable attributes are discussed in
agro-dealer technical training manuals (Rutland and Polo 2015) and
20 ICRAF, a CGIAR center, has contributed to advancing spectroscopy tech-
niques and methodologies for measuring soil (Terhoeven-Urselmans et al.,
2010; Towett et al., 2015) and plant (Towett et al., 2015) chemical compo-
sition. ICRAF utilized two methods to determine the nitrogen content: Mid-
infrared diffuse reflectance spectroscopy (MIR) and portable X-ray fluorescence
(pXRF) spectroscopy. In general, spectroscopy measures the quantities of chem-
ical elements (ie., nitrogen), by analyzing how infrared radiation responds to
physical matter (ie., fertilizer). Although spectroscopy is used widely in many
fields, ICRAF has been a world leader in developing and utilizing these tech-
nologies for agricultural applications.
21 Thornton Labs used the traditional Kjeldahl wet chemistry method for sam-
ple analysis.
22 International standards specify maximum moisture content by weight,
nutrient content by weight, particle size, and packing guidelines.
23 Caking is often a result of the fertilizer having been exposed to water or
high humidity during initial packaging and handling of manufacturer bags as
well as subsequent transportation and storage (Sanabria et al., 2013). Caking is
especially sensitive to temperature and humidity, pressure in piles and stacks,
and storage time (Rutland and Polo 2015). Discoloration is also the result of
moisture or high humidity. In the case of foreign materials, while deliberate
adulteration can be one source of the presence of foreign material, more inci-
dental cases result from the way that fertilizer is imported and prepared for
wholesalers and sellers in Tanzania.While at port, the fertilizer is often exposed
to humidity and high temperatures, as well as sand, dust, and dirt. Fertilizer
sold from opened bags or sold in informally repackaged parcels is also vulner-
able to the inclusion of foreign material. Foreign material decreases the per
weight nitrogen content of the fertilizer; the quality dilution can be incidental
(in the case of fertilizer which includes a handful of maize kernels or insects)
or more harmful if the fertilizer has been deliberately and significantly adulter-
ated. Fertilizer powdering is the result of poor handling and storage or excessive
handling or product aging.
fertilizer standards and analysis manuals (Sanabria et al., 2013; Yara
International 2012).
In addition, we collected data further upstream in the supply chain.
In 2018, we secured permits to sample fertilizer on the ships upon
arrival into Tanzania for 12 months. A relatively small number of ships
arrive with mineral fertilizer each year – between 12 and 16 ships on
average. We collected eight total samples of CAN, DAP, and UREA fertil-
izer at the point of importation. We also collected 34 samples from the
warehouses run by large importers in Dar es Salaam and we visited the
facilities to observe the storage conditions and bagging operations. All
these additional tests where conducted in the United States using the
laboratory and method described above. We also accessed data from
the Tanzanian Bureau of Standards (TBS), the institution charged since
2010 with sampling and testing fertilizer at the point of importation.
We secured and digitized comprehensive records for all ships arriving at
port with fertilizer going back to the beginning of 2016, covering a total
of 48 samples of urea, CAN and DAP. We conducted interviews with the
Tanzanian Regulatory Authority charged with testing and assessing and
maintaining fertilizer quality.
4. Analysis and results
We begin by presenting evidence on the nutrient content of the sam-
pled fertilizer from the results of the laboratory tests, their physical
condition and the relationship between fertilizer nutrient content and
physical condition. We then analyze the farmers’ beliefs and market
responses using the willingness-to-pay exercise, survey data, and qual-
itative data. We conclude this section with an analysis of the fertilizer
market, considering price responses, investment strategies, and incen-
tives.
4.1. Fertilizer nutrient content and physical attributes
Table 2 presents the results of the laboratory tests. The top panel
presents the results for the agro-dealers’ samples, the bottom panel
presents the farmers’ samples. Column (1) presents the manufac-
turer standard for the nitrogen content for each fertilizer. Column (2)
presents the share of the samples found to be out of compliance based
on the guidelines for nutrient compliance from the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS), which are the standards used in
Tanzania.24 Column (3) presents the mean and the standard deviation
(in parentheses) of the tested nitrogen. Column (4) presents the mean
deviation from nitrogen standard. This was calculated as follows: the
nitrogen content standard was subtracted from the measured nitrogen
content and the difference was divided by the nitrogen content stan-
dard, resulting in deviation from the nitrogen standard expressed as
a share of the standard. A negative figure represents a nitrogen defi-
ciency, whereas zero represents adequate nitrogen content relative to
the manufacturing standard.
On average, among the agro-dealers’ samples, urea contained 45.9%
nitrogen rather than 46%, CAN contained 24.5% nitrogen rather than
the standard 26%, and DAP contained 17.5% rather than the standard
18%. We note that urea fertilizer available from agro-dealers is largely
in accordance with international standards, with only 2% of samples
out of compliance and 0.03% of samples exhibiting a fractional devia-
tion exceeding 20%. More CAN and DAP are out of compliance, but the
deviations from industry standards are small, in the order of 5.9% and
24 To decide whether or not a sample is out of compliance, we again use the
guidelines for nutrient compliance from ECOWAS: single nutrient fertilizer with
more than 20% nutrient content max 0.5 units (0.5% for nitrogen in urea)
and max 1.1 units for individual nutrients (that means 1.1% for DAP and CAN
nitrogen).
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Fig. 2. Fractional deviation from manufacturer Nitrogen standard in samples of
mineral fertilizer purchased from agro-dealers in the Morogoro region of Tan-
zania. On average, mineral fertilizer is missing 3% of the advertised nitrogen
(n = 633).
3.0%, respectively.25
Fig. 2 presents a histogram of the fractional deviation in nitrogen
for the agro-dealer samples: 146 (out of 633) agro-dealer samples are
found to be out of compliance. A handful of samples have fractional
deviations exceeding 20%: two CAN samples, five DAP samples, and
one urea sample.
Our results are based on data from a handful of years, but the quality
of fertilizer might vary from year to year. In section 2, we explained
that nearly all fertilizer is imported via the port of Dar es Salaam by
three large companies, suggesting a concentrated value chain, as often
observed in Sub Saharan Africa (Theriault et al., 2018; Hernandez and
Torero 2011; Jayne et al., 2003). A concentrated value chain could give
rise to substantial shocks in quality should a poor batch be imported. In
our case, we noted before that 65% of the agro-dealers source from just
one supplier, and for all 225 agro-dealers, we only have 36 suppliers.
This might imply that our results on the quality of fertilizer, based on
data collection during one season, lack external validity beyond this
season (see also Banerjee et al., 2017; Rosenzweig and Udry 2020).
This would have implications for the interpretations of the WTP results
as well, as beliefs would no longer be inaccurate. However, we do not
believe this to be case. First, our data are consistent with Norton et al.
(2020) who, in 2019, tested 45 urea samples among agro-dealers in the
same region and all met the industry standards. Second, such a time-
specific shock would have to originate high up in the supply chain. We
tested fertilizer from ships and warehouses in Dar es Salaam in 2018.
All fertilizer tested met international standards for nitrogen content.26
In addition, our results are consistent with recent studies in Sub-
Saharan Africa and the East African region in particular. The Inter-
national Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) - a public international
organization focused on international fertilizer quality - releases reg-
ular reports. A 2013 IFDC report presents and discusses the results of
tests of 2037 fertilizer samples collected from 827 wholesalers, govern-
ment depots, and retailers in five West African countries (Sanabria et
al., 2013). This study finds that nitrogen problems in urea are highly
25 Comparing farmers’ with agro-dealer samples, note that slighly more, 6%,
of the farmer urea samples are out of compliance; the difference is small but
significant, with a p-value of 0.042.
26 Similarly, we noted that all samples of the TBS passed international stan-
dards for nitrogen content. In addition, the interviews with the Tanzanian Reg-
ulatory Authority revealed that they could not describe incidents in which they
have discovered fake fertilizer in the market. They reported that nearly all
reports they hear and investigate from farmers prove false.
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Table 3
Regression of the fractional deviation of nitrogen from the manufacturer standard on observable mineral fertilizer
quality attributes (agro-dealer samples).
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Standardized N deviation Standardized N deviation Standardized N deviation











































Observations 604 604 604
Agro-dealer FE Y
Market location FE Y
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
infrequent,27 with only 4% of more than 500 tested urea samples out
of compliance with standards.28 IFDC reports from Uganda and Kenya
in 2018 similarly find no nutrient issues in urea; all urea sampled and
tested by IFDC in these studies is in compliance (Sanabria et al., 2018a,
2018b). Our results are also consistent with the results presented in a
2015 policy brief funded by the Alliance for a Green Revolution for
Africa and undertaken by the Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture which
similarly found that urea was largely in compliance in Uganda, with
an average deviation of 5% across 44 samples (Mbowa et al., 2015).
Ashour et al. (2017a) also found that urea and NPK fertilizers met stan-
dards for nutrient content in Uganda with only one out-of-compliance
sample out of 220 tested.
Results of these studies and ours differ from Bold et al. (2017), who
find highly variable nutrient content and high average nitrogen devia-
tions of 30% in urea in Uganda. It is not entirely clear why the Bold
et al. (2017) study finds significant problems in urea where other stud-
ies do not. Differences with Sanabria et al. (2013) and Ashour et al.
(2017a) could be attributed to sampling strategy and testing method,
while the differences with our study might also be due to features of
Ugandan fertilizer supply chains, and perhaps the testing method.29
Table 2 also presents the results of the visual coding of the fertil-
izer’s physical condition for the farmer samples and the agro-dealer
samples. We observed caking in 15% of farmer samples and 28% of
samples obtained from agro-dealers. Approximately 6% of farmer sam-
ples were discolored, compared to 10% of agro-dealers’ samples. 9% of
27 Quality problems are more significant for some of the fertilizer blends and
the report discusses that such problems could be due to a number of factors
including settling particles, blending problems, or manufacturing issues. Over-
all, they characterize evidence of adulteration in mineral fertilizer in the region
as “weak”.
28 The nitrogen shortage tolerance limit in urea is just 0.5% due to the low
variability expected for nitrogen content in urea.
29 Bold et al. (2017) used a lab in Uganda relying on the Kjeldahl method and
took the average of three test results for each sample. Ashour et al. (2017a)
use two labs in Uganda using two methods - Kjeldahl and a method based
on combustion - to double test 187 fertilizer samples and find the Kjeldahl
method results unreliable, with a low correlation between test-retest results for
the same samples. We rely both on Kjeldahl (conducted in Florida, USA) and
pXRF methods (in Nairobi) but find a high correlation across the methods for
our tests.
farmer samples had foreign material present, as opposed to 5% of agro-
dealer samples. 8% of both the farmer and agro-dealer samples con-
tained powdered granules. Overall, one quarter of the fertilizer samples
had issues with their physical appearance such as caking, discoloration,
powdering, or the presence of foreign material. These rates again are
consistent with a 2013 IFDC report documenting comparable incidence
rates of physical quality issues in West Africa (Sanabria et al., 2013).
We present the observed rates of these observable quality attributes dis-
aggregated by fertilizer type in the appendix (Tables A1-A3). Urea has
the highest incidence of caking, with 42% of the agro-dealer samples
exhibiting the presence of hard clumps and 17% of farmer samples.
CAN and DAP are more likely to be discolored and CAN samples are
the most likely to contain powdered particles.
To assess the relationship between fertilizer’s physical appearance
and nitrogen content, which is never observable to the farmer, we
present the results of analyses in which we regress the fractional nitro-
gen deviation on the four observable quality attributes for all fertilizer
samples purchased from agro-dealers: caking, powdering, foreign mate-
rial, and discoloration. Table 3 Column (1) presents the results using
standard OLS with robust standard errors. Column (2) an agro-dealer
fixed effect and Column (3) adds a market location fixed effect. The
standardized nitrogen share has been multiplied by 100 in analyses
presented in Table 3 so that it is expressed as in change in percentage
points to ease interpretation of the coefficients.
We note that the observed properties of the fertilizer exhibit no rela-
tionship with the nitrogen quantity. That is, physical quality can exhibit
degradation without underlying degradation in the nutrient content.30
This is expected, given the low magnitudes and frequencies of miss-
ing nitrogen that we found based on the lab tests and the high rates
of attributes related to poor physical appearance. This lack of varia-
tion in the dependent variable, nutrient content, contributes to large
30 As a check, we also analyze the relationship between the measured mois-
ture content of the samples and observed quality attributes; moisture content
is directly related to caking and powdering of granules (powdering makes the
fertilizer likely to more readily and quickly absorb moisture). As expected, evi-
dence of powdering is positively associated with moisture content and caking is
similarly associated with higher moisture content. Discoloration and the pres-
ence of foreign material have no relationship with the measured moisture con-
tent. Details available on request.
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confidence intervals in Table 3, limiting our ability to exclude any
economically-meaningful correlations.31
Agro-dealers appear aware of these high levels of degradation in
fertilizer’s observable characteristics. When we spoke with the owners
of 15 agricultural shops randomly selected from the available shops in
Morogoro town, nearly all reported regularly receiving fertilizer from
their own suppliers with caked aggregates, powders, discoloration, and
foreign material. They argued that the presence of these characteristics
is related to transportation and storage issues. Unlike farmers, how-
ever, agro-dealers are confident in the nutrient quality of the fertilizer
they sell. In Appendix Table A4 we present agro-dealer responses to
the question “How do you identify high quality fertilizer?“, to which
respondents were permitted to choose multiple responses. Agro-dealers
mentioned trusting their own suppliers and testing the fertilizers that
they sell on their own fields, and explained that they rely on aggre-
gated feedback from their farmer customers to assess quality. Some
agro-dealers mentioned also paying attention to the printed expiration
dates, the weight, and condition of bags.
4.2. Willingness-to-pay for fertilizer
To gain a better understanding of what drives farmer willingness-
to-pay (henceforward WTP) for fertilizer we regress WTP on the phys-
ical appearance (clean sample, caked sample, and sample with foreign
material present) and whether the WTP was stated before or after the
farmer had received information about the nutrient quantity (this vari-
able takes the value 0 prior to the information and 1 after the informa-
tion was provided).
The intuition behind this empirical strategy is the following: if the
farmer is risk-averse, and if crop performance (positively) depends on
the quality of fertilizer, then both decreasing the uncertainty regard-
ing nutrient quality through information about the test results and
increasing its expected value will increase WTP. In contrast, the phys-
ical attributes of the non-clean samples might decrease the expected
quality, and hence decrease WTP.
In Table 4 - Column (1), we approximate the WTP using a linear
model. We estimate:
WTPit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Pi + 𝛽2It + 𝛽3Pi ∗ It + 𝜀it (1)
Where WTPit is the WTP for fertilizer sample i at time t. This sub-
script t indicates whether the WTP was elicited pre-information or post-
information. The physical attributes of fertilizer sample P correspond
to a series of dummy variables referring to fertilizer sample A, B and
C. Recall that Sample A is the pristine, white urea; Sample B included
several large, hard caked aggregates; and Sample C included the pres-
ence of a small amount of dark-colored foreign material. The variable I
for information is a dummy variable indicating whether the WTP was
stated pre or post information (I = 0 for pre-information and I = 1 for
post-information). Column (2) adds a farmer fixed effect (each farmer
completed six assessments, three before and three after the information
was provided). In the discussion of the results, we will reference the
specification with the farmer fixed effect, presented in Column (2).
As a benchmark for the reported WTP, the average per kilo price
of urea in the region during the time of the assessment was 1500 TZS.
Analysis of the WTP assessment yields two important insights.
First, farmer WTP for perfect quality fertilizer (both in terms of
nitrogen content and physical condition) exceeds the market price.
31 Fertilizer with sufficient presence of foreign material mixed would mechan-
ically lower nutrient content. None of the samples that we purchased in the
market or that we received from farmers had sufficient quantity of non-fertilizer
material to do so, as many with foreign material present simply included few
small sticks or maize kernels. When we tested the fertilizer, the analyst removed
these items first before crushing the entire sample, and taking a random sample
for nutrient testing.
Farmers’ mean pre-information WTP for Sample A, the sample in good
physical condition, is 1489 TZS, approximating the prevailing market
price in the region at the time. However, after receiving information
about the lab-tested nutrient quality of the urea, farmers’ mean WTP
increases by 48% to 2201 TZS, well exceeding the market price. The
post-information WTP on Sample A provides a counterfactual – what
farmers in our sample would pay for fertilizer without uncertainty
about nitrogen content. This increase indicates that credible informa-
tion works, a point to which we return below.
Second, the assessment suggests that farmers’ WTP for fertilizer
responds to the physical condition of the fertilizer. The WTP for the
three samples, pre and post information, are presented in Fig. 3. Recall
again that Sample A is the pristine, white urea; Sample B included sev-
eral large, hard caked aggregates; and Sample C included the presence
of a small amount of dark-colored foreign material.
Prior to the provision of the lab tests on nitrogen content, farmers
discounted Sample B and Sample C relative to Sample A by 738 and
788 TZS, respectively (Column (2)). This value includes what can be
interpreted as both the signaling value of the poor physical characteris-
tics as well as costs associated with handling fertilizer with poor physi-
cal qualities. Farmers’ WTP increases significantly for all three samples
after enumerators provide farmers with the test results demonstrating
good quality. Post-information WTP increases for Sample B and Sam-
ple C are approximately 1000 TZS; resulting in a post-information WTP
for these samples which, again, exceeds the prevailing market price.
The difference in these differences can be interpreted as the signaling
value of poor attributes, equal to 283 TZS and 251 TZS, respectively,
for Sample B and C. This signalizing value represents 16–19% of the
market price, or the pre-information WTP for Sample A, the pristine
sample. This figure is notable. Recall that in Table 3 we found no evi-
dence of a relationship between physical attributes of the fertilizer and
the nitrogen content.
Post-information, farmers continue to report a lower WTP for the
samples with poor physical attributes relative to pristine Sample A.
The post-information difference between the WTP for Sample A, and
Samples B and C provides an estimate of the usage costs; this value is
estimated at 455 TZS for Sample B and 537 TZS for Sample C (see the
hypothesis test in Table 4).32
Note that these results depend on our choice to use urea in the elic-
itation as well as our choice to sample farmers experienced with using
mineral fertilizer. We are using a selected sample of farmers who are
likely more knowledgeable and more optimistic about fertilizer quality
(given that they purchase and use it). In particular, we suspect that the
WTP for Samples B and C (those with poor appearance) in our sample
of farmers is likely to be higher than the WTP among farmers without
experience using fertilizer. This in its turn would result in an under-
estimate of the signaling value, and possibly also information effects
for these fertilizer samples. As such, our estimate of signaling value in
particular should be treated as a lower bound. We are unsure about
the direction of the bias for fertilizer Sample A, as both information
constraints and credit constraints might play a significant role. Nor-
ton et al. (2020) conducted a similar WTP exercise, but sampled farm-
ers randomly from 18 villages in the same region using an incentive-
compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction. Of 348 farmers in the
Norton et al. study, only 34% reported ever having used fertilizer. These
32 These computations rely on the assumption that the information provided
by the researchers fully resolves farmer uncertainty regarding the nutrient con-
tent. Given the context and the design, we expect this to be the case. The WTP
exercise was executed by a team from the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, and Sokoine Agricultural University. Sokoine University is Tan-
zania’s leading agricultural university and located in Morogoro. Sokoine is well
known and well respected in Tanzania, and enjoys an excellent reputation in
the area among farmers due to its many outreach activities. During the WTP
exercise, we noted that the fertilizer samples were tested in a United States
laboratory. United States firms and standards are well-respected in the region.
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Table 4
Willingness-to-pay assessment; effect of information about unobservable nitrogen content on WTP.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WTP TZS WTP TZS WTP TZS WTP TZS























































post-info + Sample B + SampleB∗post-info = 0 −455.17
(75.58)
(P-value) 0.000
post-info + Sample C + SampleC∗post-info = 0 −536.57
(79.21)
(P-value) 0.000
Farmer FE Y Y
Observations 855 855 855 855
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Columns (3) and (4) present the willingness-
to-pay assessment, sub-group analysis; effect of information about unobservable nitrogen content on WTP with interactions for
quality sensitive farmers. We omit from these estimations the responses in which farmers reported zero WTP for both pre and
post information; these 150 responses comprise 13% of the sample and were nearly all for the sample that appeared to have the
presence of foreign material (Sample C). Results hold with the inclusion of these zero WTP estimates and are included in the
appendix (Table A6).
farmers were willing to pay 46% more for a clean, tested sample of
urea (comparable to our Sample A) than for a clean sample of urea that
lacked proof of its nutrient content. Recall, our comparative number
is 48%. The fact that these results are comparable is re-assuring. Our
elicitation method was hypothetical; using actual stakes might reduce
any social desirability bias present (as suggested also by Olesen et al.,
2010). The fact that our results are very similar to Norton et al. (2020)
suggests that this bias is likely limited.33
Our WTP results are consistent with further survey results. Recall
that (from Table 1), 15% of farmers reported that they believed that
at least 50% of the fertilizer in the market was adulterated; another
28% reported believing that more than zero but less than 50% of fer-
tilizer was adulterated. Appendix Table A5 further details the nature of
these concerns. Farmers report suspicions that fertilizer in the market-
place is adulterated: 14% reported that they suspected that they had
33 It is also notable that there is no a-priori reason why a social desirability
bias alone could result in the differential information response across Samples
A, B and C.
purchased fertilizer with this problem in the past and 21% reported
knowing someone who had similar suspicions.34 Farmers are attentive
to the physical attributes of fertilizer; more than 50% reported having
purchased caked or clumped fertilizer in a previous season and 82%
reported knowing someone who had purchased caked or clumped fer-
tilizer. When we inquired as to what one does when one receives fertil-
izer with clumps specifically, 29% indicated they would not even apply
it to their crops (while the remainder reported they would break up the
clumps before application). Further qualitative interviews confirm that
some farmers perceive a link between nutrient content and physical
attributes. In phone interviews among 43 village farmers, the major-
ity noted that they had purchased and applied poor quality fertilizer in
34 It is notable that the 2013 IFDC report we referred to in the previous section
(Sanabria et al., 2013) mentions: “With a probability of out of compliance of
0.04, the total N content compliance of urea was good. Yet, there is a perception
that urea is being mixed with non-fertilizer materials in the region, which the
study results did not confirm. A specific assessment is required to further verify
this claim.” (p. 39).
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Fig. 3. Results of the willingness-to-pay assessment, pre and post information;
specification presented in Table 4, Column (2).
the past (36/43). Among these, 25% deduced quality from poor crop
performance, while 75% noted poor physical appearance.35
The qualitative results suggest that different kinds of customer-
farmers exist, and likely only a subset of all farmers is driving the
signaling effect we observe in the data. For instance, pre-information,
16% of farmers report the same (non-zero) WTP bid for all three fertil-
izer samples shown, suggesting that they are not prone to these incor-
rect assumptions related to physical appearance and nutrient quality.
Given evidence that farmers might differ in their attentiveness to the
physical appearance of fertilizer, we conclude this section with a het-
erogeneity analysis. We divide the farmers in two samples, a group that
is highly sensitive to fertilizer quality and a group that did not report
this sensitivity. We define the quality sensitive group as the group that
listed “purchasing high quality fertilizer” among their top two concerns
at the start of a typical agricultural season during the survey (24% of
farmers). We run an extension of Equation (1), interacting an indicator
for these quality-concerned farmers with the pre-post-information sig-
nal indicator, the physical attributes indicator (we pool samples B and C
to increase power), and the interaction between the physical attributes
and information indicators:
WTPijt = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Pi + 𝛽2It + 𝛽3PiIt + 𝛽4QjPi + 𝛽5QjIt
+𝛽6QjPiIt + 𝛽7Qj + 𝜀it (2)
Where subscript j indicates farmer j. In specification (2), Qj indicates
whether the farmer self-identified as concerned about purchasing high
quality fertilizer.
Table 4, Columns (3) and (4) present the results of this sub-group
analysis. Column (3) presents specification (2); Column (4) drops the
quality-sensitivity indicator and includes farmer fixed effects. We find
that, as hypothesized, the quality-sensitive farmers are more attentive
to the physical attributes of the samples; the estimate of 𝛽4 is large, neg-
ative, and significant. Their WTP for these samples is significantly lower
than the WTP of farmers who do not self-identify as quality-concerned.
We find no evidence of belief stickiness however: the quality-concerned
farmers have a stronger response to the quality information provided in
the WTP exercise for the poor looking fertilizer samples (the estimate
on 𝛽6 is positive, and significant).
35 Among the 41 Morogoro town customers, only 25% noted that clumping of
fertilizer this indicates quality issues, while 25% just noted that it is harder to
apply (with 50% noting clumps are not an issue).
4.3. Market responses
Finally, we consider the market response. First, given evidence that
farmers take observable physical attributes as a signal of nutrient con-
tent, do we see prices respond to these attributes? Second, do agro-
dealers invest in improving the observable physical attributes? Third, as
farmers already have established beliefs about the low nutrient content
and given that nutrient content is unobservable, why don’t agro-dealers
adulterate fertilizers?
4.3.1. Relationship between prices, nutrient content and physical attributes
Table 5, Columns (1), (4) and (7), present the results of regressions
of the per-kilogram price of fertilizer on the physical condition of each
fertilizer sample (caking, discoloration, powdering, presence of foreign
material) as well as the unobservable fractional nitrogen deviation for
urea, CAN, and DAP samples (samples from fertilizer agro-dealers),
respectively.
As expected, we find no statistically significant relationship between
the price and the nitrogen content, with the exception of DAP, where
higher-price DAP is associated with higher nitrogen. More surprisingly,
we find no relationship between physical appearance and price: there
is no evidence that the physical appearance affects the price. Foreign
material present is actually correlated with a higher price in urea fertil-
izer, though the number of urea samples with foreign material is small
at 20, less than 10% of the total samples.36 This disconnect suggests
that while farmers place a lower value on fertilizers with compromised
physical attributes, we do not find evidence of any downward pressure
on the market prices of fertilizer with these attributes.
Columns (2), (5), and (8) add features of the transaction, agro-
dealer, and location that might be observable at the time of purchase.
Fertilizer purchased from open bags in one or 2-kg quantities are sig-
nificantly more expensive than fertilizer purchased in 50 or 25 kg bags,
possible evidence of quantity discounting. Columns (3), (6) and (9) run
the model for only samples of one or 2 kg that were repacked for sale by
the agro-dealer or purchased from open bags at the time of the transac-
tion. The large standard errors on the nutrient content and the observ-
able characteristics measure in Table 5 are related to the lack of mean-
ingful variation in the prices.37
In effect, we observe little variation in market prices for fertilizer,
both within and across market centers. In 58% of the market centers
where we purchased urea from multiple agro-dealers on the same day,
we find no price variation across agro-dealers – all prices are the same
(40/68 market centers). In addition, we find no within-agro-dealer vari-
ation in prices for two fertilizer samples with different physical appear-
ance (with the presence of clumping and without) purchased on the
same day. We have 40 samples of urea from 20 agro-dealers (two from
each dealer) that were purchased on the same day for which one sam-
ple has clumps and the other does not. In each case, the price charged
by the agro-dealer was the same.
This lack of correlation between the fertilizer’s physical appear-
ance and the price is confirmed in the series of qualitative interviews
36 While we find a small and statistically significant negative correlation
between the presence of foreign materials and the fertilizer price using the
famers’ price data, we note that the sample of fertilizer from farmers with for-
eign material present is small - about 8% of the total farmer samples.
37 It is plausible that downward pressure on prices would be evident only with
increased market competition, especially given our limited sample. In our sam-
ple, 47% of the markets have more than one agro-dealer. In Appendix Table A6
we present the results of a regression investigating the correlation between the
market price and the physical attributes of the fertilizer sample under condi-
tions of competition. We focus on clumps and the presence of foreign materials
because there is minimal powdering and discoloration in the samples in the
low-competition markets. We again note the lack of a statistically-significant
relationship between physical appearance and price, even under competitive














Regression of the per kilo price on observable mineral fertilizer quality attributes, samples from agro-dealers.
urea fertilizer DAP fertilizer CAN fertilizer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TZS TZS TZS TZS TZS TZS TZS TZS TZS
per kg per kg per kg per kg per kg per kg per kg per kg per kg


















































































































Observations 293 276 258 126 115 107 179 166 159
Enumerator FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market location FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Agro-dealer controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Columns (1)–(3) present the results for urea fertilizer, Columns (4)–(6) present the results for DAP fertilizer, and Columns (7)–(9) present the results for CAN
fertilizer. Columns (3), (6), and (9) run the model on only samples purchased from open bags. Agro-dealer controls include if the store had a visible sign, whether the store is certified/licensed by the government
to sell fertilizer, the number of other customers present during the transaction, gender of respondent, age of respondent, years business has been in operation, and whether fertilizer is sold every month of the
year. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 6
Relationship between shop infrastructure and physical attributes of fertilizer (agro-dealer
samples).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
































































Observations 542 542 542 542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Sam-
ple is smaller than full set of samples collected because some shop infrastructure was
unobservable to the enumerator at the time of the purchase.
we conducted with farmers. Farmers noted that prices do not tend to
vary within a market center across agro-dealers. They also mentioned
that while sometimes price discounts are given in the case of severely
degraded fertilizer, these discounts are not expected, nor common or
substantial. When we inquired about the use of discounts with the own-
ers of 15 agricultural shops randomly selected from the available shops
in Morogoro town, less than a third noted that they sometimes discount
fertilizer.
Why do farmers not receive a systematic discount for fertilizers with
degraded appearance? Part of the explanation might be that there are
likely still a substantial number of farmers who do not care about the
physical attributes, or do not take these attributes as indicators of low
nutrient content. Results from our WTP exercise indicate that 16% of
farmers do not respond to physical attributes – that is they report the
same (non-zero) WTP bid for all fertilizer samples shown (prior to the
enumerator providing information on the tested nutrient content).
In addition, the cost of shopping around for good-looking fertilizer
is high given the prevalence of fertilizer with poor physical appear-
ance in the supply chain. We noted that 40% of the samples tested
had poor physical attributes, and these are more or less evenly spread
across dealers and markets, resulting in 72% of sellers having fertil-
izer samples with poor physical appearance. As we discuss in the next
section, this is likely the result of storage and transportation problems
occurring upstream in - what we have show to be – a very concentrated
value chain.
This implies that switching costs can be substantial. Conditional
on one dealer not having any good looking sample, the probability of
another dealer within the same market having a good looking sample
is small, only 34%. Taking into account the average distance between
markets about 10 km, the cost of switching markets ranges between 500
TZS and 5000 TZS depending on whether a public bus is available, or
private transports needs to be taken. Comparing this to the signalling
value estimated earlier about 250 TZS/kg it is evident that for most
farmers, switching dealers, or markets might not be worth it.
4.3.2. Investment in storage and physical attributes
In Section 3.1 we noted that Tanzania’s fertilizer market is highly
concentrated. Further analysis of the data suggests that problems with
fertilizer’s observable quality attributes begin upstream in the supply
chain. This implies that nearly all agro-dealers have some chance in
any given shipment of having such issues. In our sample, 72% of agro-
dealers were affected by these issues.
Table 6 presents the results of a regression analysis mapping the
physical appearance onto agro-dealer investments in improved storage.
We find that the physical condition is not explained by the agro-dealer’s
own shop infrastructure such as the use of pallets for storage.
In short, problems with fertilizers’ physical appearance seem to
present as shocks to agro-dealers (though these could be based on unob-
served variables at the agro-dealer level). Actions in terms of improved
storage and handling taken by agro-dealers may prevent further degra-
dation but they all accept some chance of receiving product from their
suppliers of compromised physical condition.
To add further support to this proposition, we visited a bagging
facility in Dar es Salaam run by one of the major fertilizer importing
companies. The fertilizer comes to the bagging facility from the port
and is stored there until it is packaged into 50 and 25 kg bags. The
fertilizer was kept on a bare dirt floor that was wet at the time of the
visit. Vehicles bagging and scooping the fertilizer drove over it as they
worked, individuals frequently walked over it before it was bagged, and
the piled fertilizer included large visible clumps.
When we spoke with the owners of 15 agricultural shops ran-
domly selected from the available shops in Morogoro town, almost
all reported regularly receiving fertilizer from their own suppliers with
some clumps. When asked for the reason, they agreed that the problem
is related to prevailing modes of transportation and storage. Accord-
ingly, when we inquired about what could be done to prevent physi-
cal degradation, all agro-dealers referred to improved storage practices,
such as using pallets to store the bags (rather than placing the bags
directly on a concrete floor), and the use of ventilation in the storage
space, but all recognized that even when this is done, one cannot restore
a bag of clumpy, powdered fertilizer to its original pristine condition.
4.3.3. The scope for adulteration
Profitable adulteration of fertilizer is difficult. Substantial quantities
of low-value fillers must be included for a palpable effect on profits
and urea presents particular problems: the small prills are relatively
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uniform in size and color and very few plausible fillers are available
at a cost lower than urea itself. For example, kaolin clay will coat the
prills and change their opacity but costs significantly more than urea
by weight and sodium hydroxicide (lye) micro beads, while visually
plausible before combining - is both reactive with urea and also more
expensive than urea. Salt is both inexpensive and non-reactive with
urea but has granuales that are considerably smaller than urea prills and
that are easily visually detectably to all but the extremely inexperienced
buyer. Adulteration of fertilizer blends such as NPK and CAN may be
easier because particle sizes differ in the blends but still the required
fillers must be used in large enough quantities that their presence is
likely to be detected visually.
Researchers at the IFDC argue that the presence of such extrane-
ous material is so evident that only smallholder farmers with virtually
no knowledge of fertilizers will be fooled (Joaquin Sanabria, personal
communication, March 27, 2018). Smallholder farmers represent only
a small share of the market (in terms of purchase quantity) in many
regions and the deception is unlikely to pay off at the agro-dealer
level. Though adulterating fertilizers in large volumes is most prof-
itable, fraud at this scale is also most likely to be caught by authorities
and clients.38
5. Conclusion
Crop yields have remained largely stagnant over the past 50 years in
most of Sub-Saharan Africa. While cereal yields in South America and
Asia have at least doubled since the 1960s and now average 4–4.5 met-
ric tons per hectare, cereal yields in Sub-Saharan Africa lag far behind,
averaging 1.2–1.7 metric tons per hectare (World Bank, 2020a, 2020b;
Ray et al., 2012). In the long-term, uncertainty regarding fertilizer qual-
ity could have major consequences for the persistence and growth of
mineral fertilizer demand, hampering efforts to increase adoption of
fertilizer as a means of raising regional agricultural productivity and
improving household and national food security (McArthur and McCord
2017).
In this paper, we use quantitative and qualitative data on a sam-
ple of farmers and a census of fertilizer agro-dealers to ascertain facts
regarding fertilizer quality and to measure the responses of small-scale
farmers and agro-dealers.
We find that the quality of fertilizers for sale in retail shops largely
meets national manufacturing standards for nutrient content: nearly
950 fertilizer tests over 4 years at multiple levels in the supply chain
including shops, wholesalers, farmers, and importing ships, establishes
that fertilizer is good – that it has the required nutrients. Our finding
that fertilizer in the region is of good agronomic quality is consistent
with the majority of recent studies on the topic (Sanabria et al., 2013,
2018a, 2018b, Mbowa et al., 2015; Ashour et al., 2017a).
And yet, the farmers we interviewed are widely suspicious of
the agronomic quality of fertilizer for sale in these markets. Their
willingness-to-pay for fertilizer approximates the market price, but
increases by about 50% when we provide credible information about
its quality, i.e. the unobservable nitrogen content. This is indicative of
an information gap. Concerns about quality are reinforced by stories in
the popular press. For example, The Citizen, a major Tanzanian English
Language newspaper, reported in 2016 that the Tanzania Fertilizer Reg-
ulatory Authority (TFRA) had discovered “fake” in markets across the
38 The 2013 IFDC report finds evidence of only ten cases out of 2037 collected
samples in which strange substances or excessive fillers were identified. All of
these cases were a special Single Superphosphate fertilizer collected in Nigeria;
seven of these were found based on chemical analysis to contain no phosphate.
Ashour et al. (2017a, 2017b) identify one urea sample out of compliance for
nitrogen in their Uganda study and write, “this sample is easily discernible, as
it does not even look like fertilizer” (p. 11).
country and that 40% of fertilizer for sale in the country was counter-
feit (Kasumuni 2016).39 In 2014 the same newspaper reported a seizure
and destruction of counterfeit fertilizer (Lugongo 2014).
Why and how farmer beliefs diverge from the truth in this mar-
ket is an important area of future research. Standard economic theory
assumes rational, correct expectations, and presumes that if these are
not present at the start, over time, in equilibrium, they will develop
(for a discussion see Blume et al., 1982 and Marimon 1997). In effect,
it can be shown that once an individual engages in traditional pas-
sive Bayesian learning, and receives unbiased signals, eventually, this
individual will learn the truth. Hence, not learning the truth implies a
deviation from this model (Kahneman 2003). Recent empirical litera-
ture among farmers has documented non-Bayesian processes (Gars and
Ward, 2019), ambiguous prior beliefs (Kala, 2019), and misattribution
(as in Norton 2019). Our results contribute to this growing literature.
Our research suggests a second dimension of fertilizer quality has
some signaling role: the observable physical appearance, which apart
from some additional processing costs does not impact agronomic
effectiveness. We find widespread evidence of degradation in physi-
cal appearance in the market but we find no statistically significant
correlation between the two dimensions of quality, i.e., the physical
appearance does not provide information about unobservable nutrient
content. Farmers, however, prove attentive to this observable physical
condition of fertilizer and results from the willingness-to-pay exercise
suggest that they may use it to infer unobservable nutrient quality. It
is likely that observable condition is just one of the signals farmers use
in this environment; fertilizer bag condition, store location, brand, and
crop yields likely also play a role.
Given farmer suspicions and our finding that farmer willingness-to-
pay responds to credible information about unobservable nitrogen con-
tent, is nutrient content certification or labeling a viable solution for
information problems in this market?40 In general, whether or not cer-
tification increases welfare depends on the willingness-to-pay for higher
quality, the costs of implementing, monitoring, and enforcing the certi-
fication, and how fast farmers update their beliefs, as well as their ini-
tial beliefs (as this will determine how quickly reputation can be estab-
lished; see also Marinovic et al., 2018 and Auriol and Schilizzi 2015).
Bai (2015) provides quality certification labels in the watermelon mar-
ket in China but finds that profit increases may not justify certification
investments for individual sellers. Oya et al. (2018) provide a system-
atic review of certification schemes in the agricultural sector and find
mixed success.41
The prospects for fertilizer labeling and credible nutrient content
certification in Tanzania are limited at this stage. Current government
bodies charged with the task of regulating fertilizer sales and impor-
tation such as the Tanzanian Fertilizer Regulatory Authority (TFRA)
and Tanzanian Bureau of Standards (TBS) lack the financial support
and manpower to enforce their existing mandates. A labeling initia-
tive could come from the private sector but margins in fertilizer are
extremely thin and any undertaking that increases the fixed costs of
fertilizer sales seems unlikely to succeed. A third-party certification by
39 Follow-up research into this story in 2019 by members of our research team,
including interviews with the journalist who wrote it, established that the 40%
figure itself came from farmer speculation and was not based on testing or
assessment.
40 See Leyland (1979) for an introduction on certification, Henson and Caswell
(1999), Verbeke (2005), Grunert (2005), Costa-Font et al. (2008), Messer et al.
(2017) for examples.
41 Other programs also show mixed results. Hoffmann et al. (2017) finds that
labeling maize for afflatoxin, a toxic fungus, in Kenya affects consumer demand
in the short term but not in the long term (but Garrido et al. (2017) find overall
limited impacts in a similar context). See also Ashour et al. (2017a, 2017b) and
Sanogo and Masters (2002).
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an independent group may have more promise but it is unclear who
might assume such a task.
Overall, farmer suspicions about quality may partially explain the
slow uptake of the use of fertilizer in Tanzania. Concerns regarding
quality could affect adoption at both the intensive and extensive mar-
gin. Indeed, if concerns about quality push down farmers’ expected
marginal productivity for fertilizer (as suggested by the expectations
elicited by Bold et al., 2017), farmers will apply less fertilizer at a
given price, and at some stage, apply none on a particular crop or field.
While many studies have considered the marginal yield effects of fer-
tilizers (Kaliba et al., 2000, Duflo et al., 2008, Marenya and Barrett
2009, Sileshi et al., 2010, Chivenge et al., 2011, Suri, 2011, Beaman
et al., 2013, Liverpool-Tasie, 2017), we see the need for more stud-
ies which further investigates the different margins at which farmers
operate, and the role of their subjective beliefs on fertilizer quality and
effectiveness.
In the long-term, uncertainty regarding fertilizer quality could have
widespread consequences for the functioning and growth of fertilizer
demand in low income countries. It is critical to understand not merely
the determinants of quality and quality degradation but also how farm-
ers are assessing fertilizer quality, what attributes they care about,
and how they decide whether a purchase has those attributes. Increas-
ing small farmer use of fertilizer and hybrid seeds is key to improv-
ing regional agricultural productivity and raising incomes and food
security but use of these inputs remains relatively low. Our results
suggest farmer concerns about quality are an important piece of the
puzzle.
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Appendix
Table A1
Prevalence of poor physical attributes of fertilizer samples. CAN
Farmer samples (%) Agro-dealer samples (%)
Presence of clumps/caking 20.0 15.5
Discolored 0.0 13.8
Presence of foreign material 0.0 1.7
Presence of powdered granules 0.0 14.9
n 5 181
Table A2
Prevalence of poor physical attributes of fertilizer samples. DAP
Farmer samples (%) Agro-dealer samples (%)
Presence of clumps/caking 9.3 14.6
Discolored 1.9 23.1
Presence of foreign material 7.4 1.5
Presence of powdered granules 0.0 1.0
n 54 130
Table A3
Prevalence of poor physical attributes of fertilizer samples. urea
Farmer samples (%) Agro-dealer samples (%)
Presence of clumps/caking 16.9 42.0
Discolored 7.6 2.4
Presence of foreign material 11.0 8.2
Presence of powdered granules 11.0 6.8
n 118 293
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Table A4
Left panel shows farmers’ reported personal experience with fertilizer quality (n = 165). Right panel shows agro-dealer responses to questions about signs of good
quality fertilizer (n = 225). Agro-dealers could list multiple responses.
Ever had fertilizer with
this problem? (%)
Ever known someone
who had fertilizer with
this problem? (%)
Agro-dealers who report
using as a sign of good
quality (%)
Adulterated 14 21 Bag weight 7
Expired 30 57 Packaging condition 22
Nutrient content differ Expiration date 45
from advertised 20 38 Trust in supplier 24
Caked and clumped 55 82 Trust in manufacturer 25
Source: data collected by the authors.
Table A5
Regression of the fractional deviation of nitrogen from the manufacturer standard on observable
mineral fertilizer quality characteristics (agro-dealer samples), by fertilizer type.
(1) (2) (3)
UREA DAP CAN





























Observations 293 130 181
R-squared 0.013 0.011 0.026
Number of agro-dealers 167 80 115
Agro-dealer FE YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
Table A6
Willingness-to-pay assessment; effect of information about unobservable
nitrogen content on WTP.
(1) (2)
WTP TZS WTP TZS



























Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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Table A7
Relationship between market price and physical attributes under
competition (more than two sellers in the market), agro-dealer samples
(1) (2)
TZS per kg TZS per kg





















Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
urea samples only. specifications control for the month of the purchase
and whether the purchase was made from an open bag.
Table A8
Comparing prices farmers pay for fertilizer with prices paid
by enumerator mystery shoppers.
(1) (2)























Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
Specification (1) includes only urea samples, which com-
prise the majority of farmer samples. Specification (2)
includes urea, CAN, and DAP. Both specifications con-
trol for the form of the purchase: re-bagged, 50 kg bag,
scooped from an open bag.
18
H. Michelson et al. Journal of Development Economics 148 (2021) 102579
Fig. A1 Histograms of urea fertilizer prices (in TZ shillings per kilogram) paid by farmers and enumerator mystery shoppers, 2016.
Fertilizer testing
The Soil-Plant Diagnostics Spectral Lab at the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) in Nairobi, Kenya, conducted the nutrient content testing for
all of the mineral fertilizer samples. ICRAF utilized two methods to determine the nitrogen content: Mid-infrared diffuse reflectance spectroscopy
(MIR) and portable X-ray fluorescence (pXRF) spectroscopy. In general, spectroscopy measures the quantities of chemical elements (ie., nitrogen), by
analyzing how infrared radiation responds to physical matter (ie., fertilizer). Although spectroscopy is used widely in many fields, ICRAF has been a
world leader in developing and utilizing these technologies for agricultural applications. Namely, ICRAF has contributed to advancing spectroscopy
techniques and methodologies for measuring soil (Terhoeven-Urselmans et al., 2010; Towett et al., 2015) and plant (Towett et al., 2015) chemical
composition. As the spearhead of the African Soil Information Service, a project to generate new and precise soil maps for the continent, the next
focus for ICRAF is to develop and test methodologies for rapidly testing mineral fertilizer. This rapid testing would enable the fertilizer industry to
ensure that high quality mineral fertilizer is supplied and provide the ability for area-specific blending that accommodates and addresses the soil
conditions of that particular area.
The MIR technology relies on predicting the chemical values based on a set of previously calibrated data. In our case, ICRAF instructed us to
test 59 of our fertilizer samples externally, the results of which would be used as reference data to measure the nitrogen content of the remaining
fertilizer samples. The nitrogen content of these 59 samples was analyzed with a traditional wet chemistry method, the Kjeldahl method, at Thornton
Laboratories in the United States.42 For the MIR measurement of nitrogen content, ICRAF relied on Inductively Coupled Plasma Atomic Emission
Spectroscopy (ICP-OES) methods.43 For reference, the prediction capability of MIR technology for total nitrogen content for soil is good: Towett et
al. (2015) find that using MIR can predict total nitrogen with a R2 greater than 0.80.
The pXRF method is a technology that has exciting field-based applications. Unlike MIR technologies, the pXRF is a handheld device, meaning
that it can be used directly in the field. The pXRF analyzes the total elemental composition of the physical matter being measured. For example, in
the case of mineral fertilizer, this technology has the ability to serve two main purposes. First, it has the ability to rapidly test whether the fertilizer
nutrient content has degraded and/or whether it has been adulterated. Second, if area-specific fertilizer blends becomes widespread, the technology
is sensitive enough to measure whether the fertilizer is the appropriate chemical composition. Our fertilizer samples were the first set of samples to
be tested with ICRAF?s pXRF and will serve as reference data for subsequent fertilizer analyses.
Willingness-to-pay elicitation
In the assessment, we showed farmers three samples of fertilizer that the survey team had purchased from agro-dealers in the Morogoro
region and which had been lab-tested for nutrient content. All samples were of a nutrient content that met FAO and Tanzanian government fertilizer
standards and can therefore be considered good quality, despite the variation in their physical characteristics. We showed participants three samples
of Urea fertilizer: Sample A, good appearance (bright white and prilled) and good nutrient quality; Sample B, bad appearance (caked clumps with
discoloration) and good nutrient quality; Sample C, bad appearance (presence of foreign material; perhaps mixed with some DAP) and good nutrient
quality.
Participants were provided with all three samples to inspect at the same time. They were given 1 min to examine the three samples however
they chose (for example, participants were free to open the bag, touch the fertilizer, etc.). Participants were then asked to provide the enumerator
with the highest price that they would be willing to pay for the sample. After obtaining the initial willingness to pay, participants were provided
with information on the measured (unobserved) nutrient quality of each sample. The following script was used for each sample:
I would like to show you three different 1-kg samples of Urea purchased from agro-dealers in Morogro Region. I will give you 1 min to look at
the first sample. Please feel free to examine it in whatever way you see fit. Then, I will ask you some questions about the sample. Afterwards, we
42 The specific procedure used was AOAC 955.04. More information is available here: http://www.eoma.aoac.org/methods/info.asp?ID=29898.
43 The method was developed by KU Lueven University, additional information can be found here: https://www.mtm.kuleuven.be/equipment/ICP-OES/ICP-OES.
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will repeat the same exercise for a second sample of 1 kg of Urea and then the third. Please keep your comments and reactions between yourself
and me. Please do not share your comments and reactions with any other participants. Let?s start with the first sample of Urea.
Now, I would like to provide you with information on the nutrient and moisture content of these fertilizer samples. Fertilizers, including Urea,
have nutrient and moisture standards that ensure that the fertilizer will improve soil fertility and help the crops to grow. For example, in Urea, the
most important element is Nitrogen and samples of Urea should contain 46% Nitrogen. Also, Urea should not have moisture content greater than
1%.
We tested the nutrient and moisture content of these Urea samples to ensure that they meet industry and national standards. We tested the
fertilizer samples at a laboratory in Florida, USA. This particular laboratory tests the nutrient and moisture content of fertilizers for farmers and
agricultural companies in the United States. We have the results of those tests and would like to share them with you. This sample has a Nitrogen
content of X% and a moisture content less than Y%. According to the results from the laboratory, this sample meets industry standards and when
applied correctly, will improve soil fertility and help crops grow.
Note that “X” and “Y” represent the actual values of the measured nutrient and moisture content, and the statement was repeated for Sample A,
Sample B, and Sample C. After receiving the nutrient quality information, participants were again asked to provide their maximum willingness-to-
pay for each fertilizer sample.
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